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In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager's manipulative behavior on 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical evidence indicates that earnings man-
agement is widespread in practice.1 For example, 
managers use accounting judgment and real trans-
actions to influence the expectations of capital mar-
ket participants and to increase their earnings-
based bonus awards.2 ·3 Frequently, earnings ma-
nipulation or window dressing is the consequence of 
incentives based on poor performance evaluation 
(Merchant 1980), i.e., the manager's performance 
measure does not correctly reflect firm value. Then, 
conceptually, there are two ways to remedy the 
earnings management problem: 
a) directly, by performing accounting ad-
justments that yield a more congruent 
overall performance measure; 
1 Lev (2003) offers some illustrative examples. 
2 Healy and Whalen (1999) discuss different incentives for earn-
ings management. 
3 See Healy (1985); Gaver, Ga,·er, and Austin (1995); Holthausen, 
Larcker, and Sloan (1995); Klein (2002); and Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003) for evidence of earnings management at the firm-
level, and Guidry, Leone, and Rock (1999) with respect to evi-
dence at the business-unit level. 
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b) indirectly, by collecting and evaluating 
evidence to appraise whether or not the 
manager used earnings management to 
inflate reported earnings. 
Essentially, (a) requires the release of a report on 
the magnitude of earnings management, whereas 
(b) comprises the release of a zero/one-signal that 
indicates the existence of earnings management. 
This paper's objective is to analyze the effectiveness 
of both approaches to addressing the earnings man-
agement problem. 
For convenience, a report on the magnitude and the 
existence of earnings management can be related to 
audits performed by external and internal auditors.4 
While an external auditor expresses his opinion on 
whether a firm's financial statement is free of mate-
rial misstatements and quantifies the influence of 
earnings management on the firm's financial posi-
4 Section 2.2 comprises a more technical description of the 
underlying assumptions regarding the auditing processes. 
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tion5 (i.e., he issues a report on the magnitude of 
earnings management), an internal auditor ap-
praises the control framework and governance of 
the firm, and reports on the compliance with firm 
policies (comprising, e.g., a report on the existence 
of earnings management). 
Either report is especially of relevance in situations 
characterized by a short-term relation between the 
manager who exerts the manipulative effort and his 
superior, e.g., because the manager expects to be 
promoted to a new job. Then, any reversals that are 
inherent in earnings management do not affect the 
manager's future compensation, such that earnings 
manipulation can result in a substantial wealth 
transfer to the manager. A similar argument applies 
to settings where institutional constraints impose a 
finite (i.e., short-term) contract, and where con-
tracts are subject to mutually beneficial renegotia-
tion (Hofmann 2004). In summary, the subsequent 
analysis investigates a setting where a non-
congruent performance measure motivates legal 
earnings management and unfeasible long-term 
contracts prevent the inherent reversion of earnings 
management to be instrumental in ex-post settling 
up. 
While common intuition suggests that by attaching 
a sufficiently high penalty to the indicator variable 
on the existence of earnings management, the prin-
cipal is able to preclude earnings management, the 
consequences for effort incentives and regarding the 
relative effectiveness of the two approaches are less 
clear. In summary, I find, firstly, that preventing 
earnings management by use of an indicator vari-
able does not, in general, coincide with stronger 
effort incentives. Secondly, (partly) filtering earn-
ings manipulation to achieve a more congruent 
overall performance measure can actually increase 
the agent's effort to manipulate earnings. Neverthe-
less, under conditions that yield excessive earnings 
management, these accounting adjustments can be 
more effective in reducing earnings management 
than internal audits that provide a yes/no-statement 
regarding the manager's attempts to manipulate the 
books. 
Key to my results is that both approaches to ad-
dressing the earnings management problem yield 
5 For example, in Germany, § 321 Abs. 2 Satz 4 HGB in conjunc-
tion with IDW PS 450 (74) specifY that the auditor has to quantifY 
the impact of earnings management on the firm's net assets, 
financial position, and results of operations. Similar rules apply, 
e.g., to the UK via U10 ICAEW. 
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noisy reports. For example, following Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), external auditors typically dif-
fer with respect to the cost of measuring earnings 
management, suggesting that an external auditor 
will provide a noisy measure of the extent to which 
reported earnings deviate from true earnings. Simi-
larly, the process of collecting and evaluating evi-
dence by the internal auditor regarding the exis-
tence of earnings management is, most likely, noisy 
as well (Ijiri and Kaplan 1971). Moreover, ignoring 
fraudulent accounting practices in the subsequent 
analysis increases the noisiness of both auditors' 
reports, since it is more difficult to distinguish earn-
ings management from the legitimate exercise of 
accounting discretion for those judgments and es-
timates that fall within GAAP (Dechow and Skinner 
2000). 
Basically, the measurement error inherent in the 
indicator is twofold: A Type I error (false positive) 
arises if the indicator signals earnings management, 
although the manager did not exert manipulative 
effort. On the other hand, a Type II error (false 
negative) exists if the indicator signals no earnings 
management, while the manager did exert manipu-
lative effort. The magnitude of both errors depends 
on the internal auditor's diligence in collecting and 
evaluating evidence and the Type I error will, in 
general, differ from the Type II error. Moreover, I 
assume that even if the indicator variable signals the 
existence of earnings management, its impact on 
reported earnings cannot be "undone". Hence, the 
focus of the internal audit is on detecting the com-
pliance with firm policies regarding overstatements 
or understatements in financial reports, rather than 
releasing a report on "true earnings". 
In the analysis, I consider a setting where an agent 
exerts productive and manipulative effort, an aggre-
gate performance measure reports on both actions, 
an external auditor's report signals the magnitude of 
earnings management, and an internal auditor's 
report signals whether the manager performed 
earnings management. To simplify the analysis, I 
assume that the compensation contract is restricted 
to be a linear function of the contractible perform-
ance measures. Thus, the analysis extends the 
multi-task LEN model by including a supplemental 
binary random variable in the contract offered to 
the agent. At least two reasons motivate the use of 
the LEN model: First, linear contracts are frequently 
observed in practice. Secondly, the tractability in-
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herent in the LEN model offers a clear advantage 
compared with the analysis of optimal contracts. 
Section 3 considers the impact of a report on the 
magnitude of earnings management. Interestingly, I 
find that while the external auditor's report can 
improve the congruency of the overall performance 
measure, including this report may actually increase 
the agent's effort to manipulate earnings. Key to this 
result is that the weight chosen for the external re-
port optimizes the congruence of the overall meas-
ure plus the incentive risk imposed on the agent, 
and that the second objective can dominate the first. 
Then, by including the external report in the agent's 
performance evaluation the principal selects 
stronger effort incentives, and the stronger incen-
tives more than make up for the reduced sensitivity 
of the overall measure to window dressing. 
In Section 4, I consider the report on the existence 
of earnings management. Intuitively, the penalty 
necessary to keep the agent from manipulating 
earnings increases in effort incentives (Section 4.2). 
Also, precluding earnings management via a penalty 
in the case of an earnings management signal is 
costly to the principal, since she needs to compen-
sate the agent for the additional risk inherent in this 
noisy signal. Thus, in Section 4-3 I identify condi-
tions under which the principal does not use the 
indicator variable although it is informative about 
the agent's manipulative effort. In particular, the 
principal precludes earnings management by use of 
the indicator variable if the indicator is sufficiently 
informative (i.e., for relatively low Type I and Type 
II errors) and if the agent is not too productive. 
While this result corresponds, in general, to the 
informativeness principle (Holmstrom 1979), its 
consequence is that earnings management is either 
suppressed or not affected at all by including the 
indicator variable in the agent's contract. 
Moreover, while contracting on the indicator vari-
able keeps the agent from exerting manipulative 
effort, I find that conditions exist under which the 
principal optimally selects weaker effort incentives 
as compared to the setting without the indicator 
variable (Section 4-4). The key to this result is that 
the penalty necessary to suppress earnings man-
agement increases with effort incentives, and that 
the risk premium for a noisy indicator variable in-
creases with the size for the penalty. Hence, one 
cannot state that suppressing earnings management 
by means of, e.g., evidence on the agent's manipu-
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lative behavior, always results in stronger incen-
tives. 
Finally, my analysis shows that the direct and indi-
rect approach to addressing the earnings manage-
ment problem have starkly different consequences 
for the agent's earnings management behavior. 
While including a report on the magnitude of earn-
ings management in the agent's contract may actu-
ally increase the level of earnings management, 
including a noisy indicator variable weakly de-
creases the agent's effort to manipulate earnings. 
However, the noisy indicator will be included only 
for conditions where the extent of manipulative 
effort is rather low. In particular, under conditions 
of extensive earnings management, the availability 
of a noisy indicator variable does not help the prin-
cipal in precluding earnings management. Then, a 
combination of the two approaches can be beneficial 
to the principal: given that accounting adjustments 
sufficiently reduce the (intended) level of earnings 
management, the noisy indicator variable can be 
effective in eliminating earnings management. 
The paper is related to at least two lines of research: 
The first line considers the consequences of earn-
ings management on effort incentives. Feltham and 
Xie (1994) demonstrate that window dressing re-
sults in weaker effort incentives. Moreover, Smith 
(2002) considers the impact of improving short-
term performance at the expense of a non-financial, 
long-term measure. Whereas, in both papers, earn-
ings management is precluded only under knife-
edge conditions, I show that with an indicator vari-
able it is optimal for the principal to suppress earn-
ings management for a wider range of parameter 
values. On the other hand, several papers address 
the question regarding under which conditions 
earnings management is in the best interest of the 
shareholders. Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998) and 
Hofmann (2004) show that enabling self-interested 
managers to manipulate earnings can be beneficial 
to a principal in a limited commitment setting. 
Dutta and Gigler (2002) demonstrate that earnings 
management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost 
of eliciting truthful forecasts. Similarly, Demski, 
Frimor, and Sappington (2004, 2006) show that the 
principal may prefer a less accurate auditing proc-
ess. Different to these studies, however, in my set-
ting earnings management is always detrimental to 
the principal. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the basic notation and Section 3 
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illustrates the optimal contract if the principal con-
siders a report on the magnitude of earnings man-
agement. Section 4 explores the contracting useful-
ness of an indicator variable. Section 5 concludes. 
2. BASIC NOTATION AND MODEL 
STRUCTURE 
2.1 Agent's Actions, Performance Report, and 
Preferences 
I consider a single-period model in which, at date o, 
a risk-neutral principal hires a risk-averse agent to 
provide effort at date 1 in return for compensation 
at date 2. The agent expends effort in two tasks, and 
his choice of effort levels is characterized by (a,e)' E 
~2• While a represents productive effort, e is ma-
nipulative effort, i.e., effort that improves his per-
formance measure but contributes nothing to the 
principal's gross payoff. The agent's personal cost of 
effort is assumed to be K(a, e) = 112 (a2 + y-1 e2 ) 
where y E ~+ parameterizes the agent's personal 
cost of exerting manipulative effort (i.e., the agent's 
cost of performing earnings management decreases 
withy). 
At date 2, a report on the agent's performance is 
released (e.g., firm or divisional profit). The meas-
ure is influenced by the agent's actions and random 
noise, i.e., 
y = maa + m ee + e, 
where rn, is the sensitivity of report y to action i=a,e, 
and e~N(o,a2 ). The agent receives his compensa-
tion w E ~ at date 2, and his utility for compensa-
tion and effort is 
u(w,a,e) = -exp[-r(w- K(a,e))], 
where r is his measure of risk aversion. 
At date o, the principal offers the agent contract z. 
Without loss of generality, I assume that the agent 
has a net reservation wage of zero, i.e., he will not 
accept contractz unless E[u(z,a,e)] ~ -1. 
The gross terminal value of the firm is realized at 
date t » 2 and represented by x. Because of the long 
delay between the agent's actions at date 1 and the 
realization of the terminal value, the agent is sup-
posed to be no longer employed by the firm, such 
that outcome x is not contractible. For simplicity, 
and for emphasis, the expected gross terminal value 
of the firm is assumed to be linear in the agent's 
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productive effort, represented by E[xla,e] = b a, 
where b E ~- Hence, the expected net terminal val-
ue is 
(1) II= E[x- wla,e]. 
2.2 Auditing Technology and Auditor's Report 
At date 2 , an auditor evaluates management asser-
tions and issues a report. I consider two audits that 
differ in their respective objectives, the applied 
technology, and the collected evidence. For conven-
ience, while an external auditor performs an audit 
on the financial statements of the firm, an internal 
auditor appraises the firm's control framework and 
governance processes. Moreover, whereas the ex-
ternal auditor releases, among other information, an 
estimate of the impact of earnings management on 
reported earnings, the internal auditor issues a re-
port on the compliance with firm policies and pro-
cedures, which includes his (noisy) conclusion re-
garding the existence of earnings management. 
I assume that the external auditor applies technol-
ogy g (comprising, e.g., audit planning, test of inter-
nal controls, substantive analytical procedures, 
substantive tests of detail, or roll-forward proce-
dures6 ) to a collected set of audit evidence y gE ~ n 
(e.g., management assertions, invoices, bank state-
ments, contracts, disclosures) to obtain a report Ye 
on the magnitude of earnings management. 
Mathematically, g:~n ~~. where g(yg) = Ye = rnee 
+ ee, ee ~ N( o,ae2 ) is the noise inherent in Ye, and 
Cov[e, ee] = p a a e .7 
Second, the internal auditor applies technology h to 
audit evidence Yh E ~m to assess the existence of 
earnings management, i.e., h: ~m ~ {0,1}, with 
h(yh) = lfJ. Report lfJ is a noisy signal that indicates 
whether the agent exerted manipulative effort (i.e., 
lfJ is an indicator variable). More specifically, I as-
sume 
Pr(lfJ = lie * o) = cp and Pr(lfJ = lie = o) = 8, 
i.e., given non-zero manipulative effort, with prob-
ability <p the report signals that the agent performed 
6 Baetge, Melcher, and Schulz (2008) offer an overview of con-
temporaneous auditing methods. 
7 Considering performance measure Ye is without loss in general-
ity, since one can transform any non-aligned measures y and Ye' = 
ma'a + m;e + ee'with ee' - N(O,oe'2), and Cov[e, eeJ = p' a a'" into 
equivalent statistics y and Ye· 
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window dressing. On the other hand, even though 
the agent refrained from exerting manipulative 
effort, with probability e the report signals window 
dressing. Hence, 8 measures the Type I error and 
1-cp the Type II error. Without loss in generality, 
qJ ~ e, i.e., given lfJ = 1 the conditional probability 
that the agent exerted manipulative effort is larger 
than the conditional probability that the agent did 
not exert manipulative effort.8 Then, cp/8 E [1, oo ), 
reflects the informativeness of signallfJ with respect 
to the agent's manipulative effort. For simplicity, I 
assume that Cov[y,lfJ] = o, i.e., the noise associated 
with measuring the agent's performance is inde-
pendent from the noise associated with the indica-
tor for the agent's manipulative effort. 
Several remarks are in place: First, the focus of the 
analysis is on the effectiveness of a report on the 
magnitude versus the existence of earnings man-
agement to prevent earnings manipulation. To 
achieve the most parsimonious model for this en-
deavor, I refrain from making assumptions concern-
ing the collected evidence yg and yh, the auditing 
technologies 9 and h, and the cost of both audits. 
Moreover, I neglect incentive problems regarding 
application of the auditing technology and revela-
tion of the outcome of this process by the auditor, 
and assume that the indicator variable is insensitive 
with respect to the magnitude of the manipulative 
effort (i.e., lfJ is not informative with respect to e if 
e > o). While the absence of strategic actions of the 
auditors can be justified by a sufficient degree of 
independence, the insensitivity follows from the 
focus on the control framework and governance 
processes of the internal audit. Second, the results 
on the effectiveness of both reports to prevent earn-
ings management can give rise to an analysis of the 
combination of both audits, which is, however, be-
yond the scope of this paper. Finally, the uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of each audit report reflects 
the difficulty in assessing the existence and magni-
tude of earnings management, respectively. 
2.3Agent's Contract 
At date o, the principal offers a linear compensation 
contract to the agent. With the external auditor's 
report on the magnitude of earnings management, 
the contract is represented by Ze = (j,v,a), wherefis 
the agent's fixed wage, vis the incentive rate for the 
8 cp ;;, e does not imply that Type II error is smaller than Type I 
error. cp = .2 and e = .1 is an obvious example. 
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"filtered" performance measure, and a is the degree 
to which the disclosed earnings manipulations are 
removed from the reported performance. Hence, 
the agent's compensation, given reports y and Ye, 
and contract Ze, is 
(2a) w(y,ye,Ze) = f + v(y - aye), 
where y - aye is the filtered performance measure. 
Here, the assumptions regarding compensation 
contract, preferences, and random noise are consis-
tent with a two-task, two-performance measure 
LEN-model. 
In a similar vein, given the internal auditor's report 
on the existence of earnings management, the prin-
cipal offers a linear compensation contract repre-
sented by z; = (j,v,p) where pis the agent's penalty if 
report lfJ indicates that the agent performed window 
dressing. Hence, the agent's compensation, given 
reports y and lp, and contract z;, is 
(2b) w(y,lp,z;) = f + vy- PlfJ· 
In this setting, the linear contract assumption rules 
out (i) that the principal pays a bonus to the agent if 
there is no signal regarding earnings management 
(i.e., lfJ = o ), and (ii) that the incentive rate v for the 
performance report y depends on VJ. While (i) tends 
to be practically irrelevant, the independence as-
sumption (ii) is, e.g., common to the LEN setting.9 
3· IMPACT OF A REPORT ON THE 
MAGNITUDE OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Standard Model 
Initially, suppose that no auditor's report is avail-
able for contracting.10 Then, the principal's contract 
is represented by z = (j,v) and the agent's certainty 
equivalent is 
(3) CE(z,a,e) = E[wlz,a,e] - K(a,e) - lf2 r 
Var[wlz,a,e] 
= f + v (ma a + me e) - lf2 (a2 + y-1 e2) - lf2 r 
V 2 cr. 
9 With exponential utility, normally distributed performance 
measures, and an infinite lower bound on net consumption the 
Mirrlees problem arises (Mirrlccs 1974), i.e., by using a penalty 
contract the principal may approximate arbitrary closely first best. 
See Christensen and Fcltham (2005), Section 19.1. In my setting, 
however, an effort allocation problem exists and the signallp is a 
binary variable. 
10 This benchmark setting is equivalent to the window-dressing in 
Feltham and Xie (1994). 
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Differentiating (3) with respect to a and e and solv-
ing the first-order conditions establishes that the 
agent chooses actions 
(4) at= ma v and et = ymev. 
Interestingly, the productive effort a' and the ma-
nipulative effort et are both driven by the incentive 
rate v. More specifically, the agent does not perform 
window dressing if at least one of the following three 
conditions is met: 
(i) the performance measure is not manipulable 
(i.e., me= o); 
(ii) the cost to the agent of manipulating the per-
formance measure is excessively high (i.e., y----+ o); 
(iii) the principal does not offer performance-
contingent pay (i.e., v = o ). 
Given the agent's outside opportunities, it is optimal 
for the principal to select a fixed wage f such that 
CE(z,at,et) = o. Substituting (4) into (3), setting it 
equal to zero, solving for f, and substituting it and 
(4) into (1) yields the unconstrained objective ftmc-
tion of the principal. Differentiating with respect to 
v gives the following optimal incentive rate in the 
benchmark setting without the indicator variable. 
Substituting the optimal incentive rate into (1) 
yields the expected net payoff to the principal: 
(sa) vt = (ma 2 + yme 2 + rif) -1 b ma. 
(sb) II'= 112 (ma 2 + y me 2 + r if) - l b2 ma 2 • 
Using (sa) in (4) establishes that the principal toler-
ates agent window dressing in the standard model. 
The key to this result is that precluding window 
dressing by setting v = o results in an even lower 
expected net payoff to the principal. 
3.2 Contract on Filtered Performance Measure 
With the report Ye on the magnitude of earnings 
management, the agent's compensation is charac-
terized by (2a), and his certainty equivalent is 
(6) CE(ze,a,e) = f + v [ma a + (1- a) me e] - lf2 
(a2 + y -1 e2 ) - lf2 r V2 (if - a p a ae + a 2 a e2). 
Differentiating (6) with respect to a and e, and solv-
ing the first-order conditions yields the agent's op-
timal action choices (T.1) in Table 1. Obviously, 
setting a = 1 removes any incentives to manipulate 
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earnings without having detrimental effects on the 
productive effort choice. 
The principal selects the fixed wage f' such that 
CE(ze,ae,ee) = o. Substituting f' and (T.1) into (1), 
differentiating with respect to v and a, and solving 
for the choice variables yields the optimal contract 
parameters as characterized by (T.2). Finally, sub-
stituting (T.2) into (T.1) yields the agent's manipu-
lative effort (T.3), given the principal's optimal con-
tract choice. 11 
Table 1: 
Two Action-informative Performance 
Measures and the Agent's Manipulative 
Effort: 
ae (v) = mav and ee(v,v,J = y me (1-a) v, 
ve = D·1 (y 111,;> + r o,;z) b 11111 and 
ae = (y 111.," + r a,;>) ., (y m,;> + ,. p a a,J, with 
D = (m,P+ y 111.?+ r(J2 )(y m,?+ r a.;) - (y 111.?+ r p a a,J 2 , 
e<' = D-1 r oe y m, (o,. - p o) b 11111• 
(T.l) 
(T.2) 
Following (T.3), and as demonstrated by Feltham 
and Xie (1994), it is not optimal to eliminate the 
agent's manipulative effort unless the second meas-
ure is noiseless (i.e., ae = o), or for a knife-edge rela-
tion of the reports' noise (i.e., ae / a = p ). According 
to Datar, Cohen Kulp, and Lambert (2001), while 
the principal may choose the weight on the external 
report such that filtered profit (i.e., y - aye) is con-
gruent to the expected payoff (i.e., by setting a = 1), 
this contract parameter will, in general, impose too 
much risk on the agent. Moreover, comparing the 
agent's manipulative effort yields 
et - & = (ma2 + y me2 + r if) -1 D -1 [ma2 + r a (a- p 
ae)][y me2 + r p a ae] y me b m a, 
and the sign of this difference is ambiguous. In par-
ticular, necessary conditions for a negative sign are a 
noisy auditor's report (i.e., ae*O) that is correlated 
with the performance measure (i.e., P*O). Hence, 
filtering manipulated earnings from the agent's 
performance measure via a report on the magnitude 
of earnings management can actually increase the 
agent's window-dressing effort. Key to this result is 
the noise inherent in the auditor's report, and the 
correlation with unfiltered performance. Hence, the 
weight a is not only chosen to improve the congru-
11 Since I am only interested in the impact of the auditor's report 
on the agent's manipulative effort, I omit the expected net payoff 
to the principal in Table 1. 
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ence of the overall performance measure, but also to 
optimize the risk imposed on the agent. Thus, with a 
report on the magnitude of earnings management, 
the principal prevents earnings manipulation only 
for knife-edge cases, and including this report in the 
agent's contract may actually increase the level of 
earnings management. 
4· IMPACT OF A REPORT ON THE 
EXISTENCE OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
4.1 Optimal Agent's Action Choices 
Including the indicator variable lfJ in the agent's 
contract yields a subtle relation between the 
agent's choice of manipulative effort and his 
expected utility. For example, given that the agent 
performed window dressing (i.e., e * o), his 
compensation from y is normally distributed with 
N(f + v E[yla,Mo],v2d'). In addition, with probabil-
ity cp the internal report is lfJ = 1, and penalty p re-
duces the agent's compensation. On the other hand, 
given that the agent abstained from window dress-
ing (i.e., e = o ), his compensation from y is normally 
distributed with N(f+ v E[yia,e = o],v2d'), and with 
probability e penalty p reduces his compensation. 
Lemma 1 characterizes the agent's certainty equiva-
lent for the two cases where the agent performs 
window dressing (i.e., CEe (z;,a,e)), and where he 
abstains from window dressing (i.e., CEo(z;,a)). 12 
Lemma 1:13 Given that the compensation contract 
induces a penalty p if the indicator variable signals 
earnings management, the agent's certainty equiva-
lent is characterized by 
(7a) CEe (z;,a,e) = f + v(ma a + me e) - K(a,e) -
112 r V 2d' - r -tJn[1- cp (1- exp[r p ])], 
(7b) CEo (z;,a) = f + v ma a- K(a,o)- lf2 r V 2d'-
r - 1 ln[1- e (1- exp[r p])]. 
The first two terms in the agent's certainty equiva-
lent reflect his expected compensation, the third 
term reflects his effort cost, the fourth term captures 
the risk premium for the uncertain compensation 
based on y, and the last term reflects the expected 
penalty plus the risk premium for the uncertain 
compensation based on lfJ. The latter term is, in 
12 The subscript indicates the setting with earnings management 
(i.e., e) and without earnings management (i.e., o). 
13 The propositions are proven in the Appendix. 
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general, negative (i.e., for p > o, the penalty de-
creases the agent's certainty equivalent), and a 
higher risk aversion (i.e., r ), a larger penalty (i.e., p ), 
and larger probabilities for an earnings manage-
ment signal (i.e., cp and 8) result in a larger ex-
pected value and risk premium for the penalty. 
Differentiating (7a) and (7b) with respect to a and e 
and solving the first-order conditions results in the 
following agent's action choices: 
(8) ae* =aa* =mav, ee" =ymev, andea" =o, 
Interestingly, for an exogenous incentive rate v, the 
agent's choice of manipulative effort has no direct 
impact on the productive effort in the two settings 
(compare (8) with (4)). The key to this result is the 
additive separability of the performance report y, 
the independence of the agent's effort costs, and the 
independence of v from lfJ. As a consequence, given 
that the agent performs window dressing, its 
amount is independent of the penalty p. 
Given contract z;, and the optimal action choices 
according to (8), the agent does not perform win-
dow dressing if CEe*(z;) s; CEa*(z;). Lemma 2 sum-
marizes these results. 
Lemma 2: (a) The agent does not exert manipulat-
ive effort if the principal offers a contract z; with 
relatively weak effort incentives, i.e., if 
( ) c(p) { ( 2) - 11 (1-1,0(1-exp [rp])J}
11 2 
9a v ::; v = 2 r r m e n 
1- 8 (1- exp [r p]) 
(b) The principal cannot prevent the agent from 
choosing MO via penalty contract (2b), if 
(9b) v>{2(ryme')-1 ln[cp/ 8]} 112 • 
Equivalent to (9a), the agent does not exert manipu-
lative effort for a sufficiently large penalty, i.e., if 
c _1 [(1-8)exp[~ r r m~v2]-(1- <P)l p?.p (v) = r ln 
1,0 - 8 exp [~ r r m~ v2 ] 
Intuitively, with a sufficiently large penalty, the 
principal deters the agent from performing window 
dressing. 
Observe that the critical incentive level vc (p) in-
creases with the penalty p. Therefore, by increasing 
the penalty p , the principal is able to offer stronger 
effort incentives v without inducing manipulative 
effort. However, the threshold vc(p) increases inp at 
a decreasing rate, and, in the limit, following 
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Lemma 2 (b), an infinitely large penalty results in a 
finite threshold incentive rate. Moreover, qJ = 8 
yields vc (p) = o, i.e., independent of the size of the 
penalty p , any positive incentive rate v results in the 
agent exerting manipulative effort. Of course, the 
key to this result is that qJ = 8 results in an indicator 
variable lJ.l that is uninformative about the agent's 
manipulative effort. 
4.2 Optimal Contract Parameters 
Subsequently, I consider the principal's contracting 
choice, given the agent's anticipated choice of pro-
ductive and manipulative effort. First, I analyze the 
optimal contract if the penalty does not keep the 
agent from exerting manipulative effort. Then, I 
consider the optimal contract if the penalty is suffi-
ciently large to prevent window dressing. In the first 
(second) setting, I initially assume that the penalty 
is too small Oarge enough) to prevent window dress-
ing, and later confirm that the optimal incentive rate 
and the optimal penalty meet the conditions. In 
Section 4.3, I compare both settings to identify con-
ditions under which it is beneficial to the principal 
to keep the agent from exerting manipulative effort. 
(a) Agent Exerts Manipulative Effort 
With a relatively small penalty (i.e., for p < pc), the 
agent is motivated to exert manipulative effort. 
Then, the expected net payoff to the principal is 
(10) lle(z;,a,e) = E[xla,e]- E[wla,e] = 
= b a-f- v (ma a+ me e)+ qJ p. 
The agent accepts the contract if it guarantees his 
reservation wage (i.e., CEe*(z;) ;:: o). The principal 
selects the salary fe* such that CEe*(z;) = o. Substitut-
ingfe* and (8) into (10) gives the principal's uncon-
strained decision problem. Differentiating it with 
respect to v and p and solving the first-order condi-
tions results in the following optimal contract pa-
rameters. Substituting fe*, (8), and (11a) into (1) 
yields the expected net payoff to the principal. 
Proposition 1: Given that a relatively small penalty 
does not prevent the agent from window dressing, 
the optimal incentive rate, penalty, and the princi-
pal's expected net payoff are characterized by 
(11a) Ve* = (ma2 + yme" + rif) -1 b ma, 
pe* = o, and 
(11b) lle* = 112 (ma2 + y me2 + r if)-1 b2 ma2 • 
An interesting aspect of (11a) and (11b) is that they 
are the same as in the setting without the indicator 
variable ((sa) and Csb)). More specifically, given that 
the penalty is not sufficiently large to prevent the 
agent from exerting manipulative effort the indica-
tor variable has no value to the principal. The key is 
that while lJ.l imposes incentive risk on the agent, a 
penalty p < pc does not influence the agent's effort 
choice (see (8)). Therefore, given that there is no 
benefit to the principal of using the indicator vari-
able lJ.', her optimal choice is to select p e* = o. 
(b) Principal Prevents Manipulative Effort 
I now consider the setting where the penalty is suffi-
ciently large to keep the agent from exerting ma-
nipulative effort, i.e., p ;:: pc(v) such that e0* = o. 
Then, the principal's expected net payoff is14 
(12) ITo (z;,a) = b a - f- v ma a + 8 p. 
The agent accepts the contract if it guarantees his 
reservation wage, i.e., if CEa*(z;) ;:: o. The principal 
selects the fixed wage fo* such that CEa*(z;) = o. 
Moreover, the principal chooses po*(v) = pc(v) , 
which imposes the least incentive risk on the agent 
while preventing earnings management. Substitut-
ingfo*, po*(v), and (8) into (12) gives the principal's 
unconstrained decision problem. Differentiating it 
with respect to v yields the first-order condition for 
the optimal incentive rate as characterized by Prop-
osition 2. Solving (13) for Vo*, and substituting it into 
Po*(v) yields the optimum penalty Po*. Finally, sub-
stituting Vo* togetherwithfo* and (8) into (12) results 
in the expected net payoff llo *to the principal. 
Proposition 2: Given that a relatively large penalty 
prevents the agent from exerting manipulative ef-
fort, the optimal incentive rate Vo* is implicitly given 
by 
(13) b ma - (ma2 + r if)vo* + 8 (1-8) y me2 Vo* 
exp[lf2 r y me"(va*YJ x{((l-8) exp[l/2 r y me2(vo*YJ-
(1-qJ))-1 - (qJ-8exp[lf2 rym/ (u0*)2])-1} = o. 
With (13), except for some special cases, a closed 
form solution for Vo' is hard to find. Corollary 1 
compares the incentive rate with the benchmark 
setting where the principal can preclude earnings 
14 Observe that for e = o, the probability that ljJ signals earnings 
management is Pr(lp = lie = o) = e, i.e., with probability e the 
penalty accrues to the principal. 
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management at no cost (see Section 3.1). 
Corollmy 1 : In general, the optimal incentive rate is 
less than or equal to the incentive rate v· for the 
setting where the principal costlessly precludes 
earnings management, i.e., 
with the equality holding for 8 = o. In this case, the 
optimal penalty is given by 
* _1 [exp [~ r r m~(vbl]- (1- tp)l 
p0 =r ln . 
tp 
The principal is able to preclude earnings manage-
ment at no cost if, e.g., the agent cannot manipulate 
the performance measure (i.e., me= o), or the agent 
bears exceptionally large costs when exerting ma-
nipulative effort (i.e., y----> o). While the use of the 
indicator variable can also prevent earnings man-
agement, following Corollary 1, this outcome is 
achieved via a reduction of effort incentives. On the 
other hand, there are no negative externalities to 
using the indicator variable only for the special case 
of no Type I error (i.e., if e = o). Then, observing 
1p = 1 reveals with certainty that the agent exerted 
manipulative effort, and the penalty as given by 
(14b) is sufficient to keep the agent from performing 
earnings management. 
4-3 Contracting Usefulness of Report on the 
Existence of Earnings Management 
Subsequently, I compare the principal's expected 
net payoff when using the internal report (i.e., Ilo*) 
with the expected net payoff when the principal 
refrains from using the internal report (i.e., lle*) in 
order to identify conditions under which contracting 
on the report regarding the existence of earnings 
management is beneficial to the principal. Due to 
the complexity of the optimal contract in the first 
setting, closed-form solutions for cutoff-values are 
difficult to find. To the contrary, in order to charac-
terize the principal's tradeoff when deciding wheth-
er or not to include the internal auditor's report in 
the contract, I use numerical examples. In general, 
while I assume specific parameter values for the 
simulations, the implications of the subsequent 
results hold true for a broad set of parameter values. 
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(a) Impact of the Indicator Variable's Meas-
urement Error 
First, I analyze how the statistical properties of the 
indicator variable, i.e., the Type I and Type II errors 
(8 and 1-<p, resp.), influence the inclusion of the 
indicator variable in the incentive contract. It is 
straightforward that including 1p in the agent's con-
tract is beneficial if llo* ;::.: lle*. Figure 1 illustrates the 
expected net payoff to the principal for varying val-
ues of <p E [8,1] in the setting with (ll0*) and without 
(lle*) the indicator variable. Here, b = rna= m e = y = 
r = a= 1, and e = -4-15 
Figure 1: Expected Net Payoff to the Princi-
pal in the Settings with (llo*) and without 
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While lle* is independent of <p, flo* increases with a 
decreasing Type II error, i.e., for an increasing <p. 
Moreover, for <p E [-4, -4725] the results are such 
that lle* ;::.: llo*. In particular, although 1p is informa-
tive regarding e, the principal is better off if she did 
not include 1p in the agent's contract. The key to this 
result is that for <p E [-4, -4725] the ratio <p/8 is rela-
tively small, i.e., signal1p is only weakly informative 
with respect to the agent's manipulative effort, and a 
relatively large penalty is necessary to prevent the 
agent from window dressing. Because of the indica-
tor's noisiness, a large penalty results in a large risk 
premium to the agent, such that the cost of prevent-
ing earnings management exceeds the benefit. On 
the other hand, Figure 1 illustrates that for a rela-
15 The parameter values are such that the condition in Lemma 2 
(b) (i.e., Vo':;; {2 (r y me')-Iln[cp/ 8]} 1!2) is fulfilled. 
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tively low Type II error (i.e., for 1-qJ ~ .5275) the 
principal benefits from including the indicator vari-
able lfJ in the agent's contract. Hence, an internal 
auditor's report on the existence of earnings man-
agement will only be included in the contract and, 
thereby, prevent earnings management if the report 
is sufficiently informative with respect to the agent's 
manipulative effort. 
(b) Impact of the Performance Measure's 
Manipulability 
Secondly, I consider the impact of the performance 
measure's manipulability (i.e., m e), and the impact 
of the agent's cost of exerting manipulative effort 
(i.e., y) on the principal's preferences for including 
the indicator variable lfJ in the agent's contract (Fig-
ure 2). Again, b = m a = r = a = 1. Moreover, 8 = -4 
and qJ = -47, i.e., I consider a setting with an only 
weakly informative signallp. 
Figure 2: Regions in they- me- space 
Where the Principal Prefers the Use of the 
Indicator Variable (llo* > lle*) and Where she 
Prefers not to Include the Indicator Variable 
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Note that the principal is indifferent with respect to 
including the indicator variable in the agent's con-
tract if me= o or y ---+ o. Of course, both conditions 
correspond to the special cases identified in Section 
3.1 where the agent does not exert manipulative 
effort. Following Figure 2, the principal prefers to 
write a contract on the indicator variable for a rela-
tively low sensitivity me, or for a relatively large 
effort cost (i.e., for a relatively low effort cost pa-
rameter y). The key to this result is that, e.g., with a 
low manipulability me, exerting manipulative effort 
is not attractive to the agent. Hence, a small penalty 
is sufficient to prevent earnings management. Also, 
despite the low informativeness of lp, the principal 
prefers to bear the risk premium for this small pen-
alty as compared to suffering from lower effort in-
centives and from paying the agent for his manipu-
lative effort. 
Now, for an increasing manipulability me, exerting 
manipulative effort becomes more appealing to the 
agent. In the setting without the indicator variable, 
the principal lowers the effort incentives ve* in order 
to reduce earnings management. On the other hand, 
in the setting with the indicator variable, to prevent 
earnings management the principal increases the 
penalty p 0*. Due to the low informativeness of lp, 
and in order to limit the risk premium for the pen-
alty p, the principal reduces the incentive rate ua*. 
Ultimately, the net benefit to the principal from the 
effort incentives less the cost for the agent's manipu-
lative effort exceeds the net benefit from reduced 
effmt incentives less risk premium for the penalty. 
Thus, for an intermediate manipulability, the prin-
cipal prefers not to contract on the indicator vari-
able. 
Finally, further increasing the report's manipulabil-
ity me (or, equivalently, increasing y) reduces effort 
incentives ve* in the setting without the indicator 
variable. Then, following Figure 2, the principal 
strictly benefits from using the indicator variable 
(i.e., flo* > Ile*). The key to this result is that in 
the setting with the indicator variable, increasing me 
results in lower effort incentives Uo* (i.e., auo*jame < 
o). Then, a relatively small penalty p 0* is sufficient to 
prevent the agent from exerting manipulative effort 
(i.e., apo*jame < o for me sufficiently large). Of 
course, a small penalty requires a small risk pre-
mium, such that it is beneficial to the principal to 
use the indicator variable. 
To summarize, I find that preventing earnings man-
agement by use of an indicator variable is beneficial 
to the principal for either a relatively low or a rela-
tively high manipulability of the performance meas-
ure (or, equivalently, if exerting manipulative effort 
is either extremely costly or not costly at all to the 
agent). More specifically, the principal does not 
prevent earnings management for intermediate 
values of the report's manipulability. 
(c) Impact of the Agent's Payoff Productivity 
Finally, I consider the impact of the agent's payoff 
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productivity on the principal's choice of whether to 
include the indicator variable in the agent's contract. 
Corollary 2 summarizes the results. 
Corollary 2: Precluding earnings management by 
use of the indicator variable is impossible for a rela-
tively large payoff productivity (i.e., ::3 b such that Vo * 
> {2 (r y m/)-1ln[cp/8]} 1/2). 
Note that the principal imposes more incentive risk 
on an agent with a larger payoff productivity (i.e., 
the solution to (13) increases in b). As a conse-
quence, for a relatively large payoff productivity, the 
solution to (13) violates Lemma 2 (b). In this case, 
even an infinite penalty does not deter the agent 
from manipulating earnings. Thus, for a relatively 
large payoff productivity the principal does not pre-
vent earnings management by including the indica-
tor variable in the contract offered to the agent. 
4.4 Impact of the Report on the Existence of 
Earnings Management on Effort Incentives and 
Penalty 
In this section, I consider the impact of contracting 
on the indicator variable on optimal effort incen-
tives and penalty. Because contracting on the indi-
cator variable deters the agent from exerting ma-
nipulative effort, one may speculate that using the 
indicator variable also results in stronger effort in-
centives as compared to the setting where the indi-
cator variable is not used for contracting. However, 
Corollary 3 highlights that this is not always the 
case. 
Corollary 3: Contracting on the indicator variable lfJ 
may result in weaker effort incentives as compared 
with the setting where the indicator variable is not 
used for contracting (i.e., there exist conditions such 
that Vo* < Ve*). 
The key to Corollary 3 is that the penalty that is 
necessary to prevent earnings management in-
creases with the incentive rate v. Hence, by decreas-
ing the incentive rate the principal is able to lower 
the penalty po*, while keeping the agent from exert-
ing manipulative effort. Ultimately, this imposes 
less risk of an erroneous indicator on the agent. 
Figure 3 illustrates Corollary 3 by revisiting the 
example in Section 4.3. First, following the result of 
Section 4-3 (a), observe that for a low informative-
ness of lfJ (i.e. for low values of cp/8), the principal 
prefers not to include the indicator variable in the 
agent's contract. More specifically, with 8 = -4 (8 = 
.6), the principal contracts solely on y if cp E [-4, 
-475] (cp E [.6, .675]). Then, the effort incentive rate 
159 
ve* = vt is unaffected by the Type II error (i.e., 1-cp ), 
and the penalty is pe* = o. 
Secondly, Figure 3 shows that under the conditions 
where it is optimal for the principal to use VJ, the 
incentive rate va* increases and the penalty P o* de-
creases in cp. More specifically, for a smaller Type II 
error, the principal optimally selects a larger incen-
tive rate and a lower penalty to motivate the agent to 
supply effort and to prevent him from exerting ma-
nipulative effort. Thirdly, the figure illustrates the 
ambiguous relation between effort incentives v* and 
the indicator's informativeness cp/8. In particular, a 
more informative measure lfJ yields stronger effort 
incentives only if lfJ is included in the agent's con-
tract, i.e., following Corollary 3, including the indi-
cator variable in the contract may result in weaker 
effort incentives. Thus, preventing earnings man-
agement by the use of an indicator variable does 
not, in general, coincide with stronger effort incen-
tives. 
Figure 3: Optimal Incentive Rate v * and 
Optimal Penalty p* for Varying Values of tp 
and8 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
- 8=.4 - 8= .6 
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rp 
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates that increasing Type I 
error (i.e., 8) broadens the conditions where it is 
optimal not to use the indicator variable VJ. Interest-
ingly, given that the principal uses the indicator 
variable, a larger Type I error results in weaker ef-
fort incentives and a larger penalty. Assume, to the 
contrary, that the principal reduces the penalty as a 
consequence of a larger Type I error. A larger Type I 
error, however, makes it more likely that lfJ indicates 
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earnings management, even though the agent did 
not exert manipulative effort. Then, given the lower 
penalty and the unaffected Type II error, the agent 
is better off by exerting manipulative effort. Thus, to 
the contrary, the optimal penalty increases and the 
incentive rate decreases with Type I error. 
4.5 Effectiveness of a Report on the Existence 
Versus the Magnitude of Earnings Management in 
Preventing Earnings Manipulation 
The analysis in the previous sections shows that the 
principal can use the indicator variable tp to prevent 
earnings management. However, a key characteris-
tic of this signal is that while tp is action-
informative, it is insensitive to the magnitude of the 
agent's manipulative effort. To understand the con-
tracting usefulness of this indicator variable, it is 
helpful to compare the effectiveness of tp in prevent-
ing earnings management with the effectiveness of 
accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent 
overall performance measure, i.e., the setting with a 
report on the magnitude of earnings management 
(Section 3.2). 
Figure 4: Impact of the Performance 
Measure's Manipulability m e on the 
Magnitude of Earnings Management 
n , 
More specifically, I compare reporting system ry'l' 
that releases reports y and tp with reporting system 
rye that releases reports y and Ye· For the example 
from Section 4.3, Figure 4 illustrates the impact of 
the performance measure's manipulability me on 
the magnitude of earnings management for report-
ing systems ry'l', rye, and ry, where the latter reports y. 
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Observe that the upper curve (with dashed and solid 
line) shows the agent's manipulative effort for re-
porting system ry. For this example, reporting sys-
tems ry'l' and rye result in less earnings management 
as compared with ry. However, while reporting sys-
tem rye yields less earnings management for any 
manipulability of the performance measure y, fol-
lowing Section 4·3 (b), reporting system ry'l' yields 
less earnings management only for those conditions 
where the extent of manipulative effort is rather 
low. More specifically, under conditions of extensive 
earnings management, reporting system ry'l' does 
not prevent the agent from exerting manipulative 
effort. 
With ry'l', the agent's manipulative effort e* is either 
zero or unaffected by the indicator variable (see (8)). 
As indicated by Figure 4, the manipulative effort is 
unaffected for intermediate values of me, i.e., where 
e* is at its maximum. The key here is that to prevent 
the agent from exerting manipulative effort, the 
penalty p must reflect the attractiveness of earnings 
management to the agent (i.e., et is the agent's off-
equilibrium behavior). More specifically, to prevent 
extensive earnings management the principal needs 
to choose a relatively large penalty, which requires a 
large risk premium. For a weakly informative indi-
cator variable tp, however, the risk premium will be 
excessively large, such that the principal is better off 
if she does not prevent earnings management. As a 
consequence, a weakly informative indicator vari-
able is only useful under conditions where the ex-
tent of earnings management is low to medium. 
More generally, while including a report on the 
magnitude of earnings management in the contract 
may increase the agent's manipulative effort, con-
tracting on a report on the existence of earnings 
management weakly decreases the agent's manipu-
lative effort, but the decrease will only be strict for 
low to medium levels of earnings management. 
5· CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I examine the impact of an indicator 
variable on the agent's incentives to exert manipu-
lative effort. I show that the principal optimally 
prevents earnings management if the indicator vari-
able is sufficiently informative, the performance 
measure either weakly or extremely manipulative, 
and the agent's payoff productivity low to medium. 
More specifically, a noisy indicator variable is not 
helpful in keeping the agent from exerting manipu-
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lative effort under conditions that support excessive 
earnings management. In addition, I find that sup-
pressing earnings management by use of an addi-
tional indicator variable does not naturally coincide 
with stronger effort incentives. Thus, even if the 
principal is able to prevent earnings management by 
threatening a severe punishment in the case of, e.g., 
an internal auditor's report on the existence of earn-
ings management, occasionally, it is also optimal to 
reduce effort incentives. 
Another way to address the earnings management 
problem is to focus on accounting adjustments that 
yield a more congruent overall performance meas-
ure. Interestingly, I find that this approach can in-
crease the agent's effort to manipulate earnings. On 
the other hand, the indicator variable on the exis-
tence of earnings management weakly reduces the 
manager's manipulative effort, but only under con-
ditions that result in low to medium levels of earn-
ings management. Thus, the results suggest that 
under conditions that support excessive earnings 
management, accounting adjustments that yield a 
more congruent overall representation of the firm's 
economic value can be more effective in reducing 
earnings management than internal audits that 
provide an appraisal of whether the manager ma-
nipulated the books. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that the cost to pre-
vent earnings management increases with a man-
ager's effort incentives, which increase in his payoff 
productivity. Thus, for a large sample of managers, I 
expect that the ones with the largest payoff produc-
tivity have the strongest effort incentives, and that 
they are the ones who are not refrained from exert-
ing manipulative behavior. This implies that infer-
ring from the observed instances of earnings man-
agement for a sub-sample of managers to the perva-
siveness of earnings management in the whole 
economy is not possible. 
Finally, considering costs for issuing the indicator 
variable, it is straightforward that conditions exist 
where the principal is better off without the addi-
tional information, especially if the report is only 
weakly informative regarding the existence of earn-
ings management. Thus, a mandatory report by the 
external auditor on internal controls of public com-
panies as required by Sarbanes-Oxley will be detri-
mental for those firms where the information is not 
included in the manager's compensation contract. 
From a management perspective, one implication of 
the above analysis is that under conditions of diffi-
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cult audits, instructing two auditors (e.g., an inter-
nal and an external auditor) to independently re-
lease reports on the compliance with firm policies 
regarding earnings management and on the magni-
tude of earnings management is most effective in 
precluding manipulations to the financial state-
ments. Then, accounting adjustments based on the 
reported magnitude of earnings management can be 
used to lower the performance measure's sensitivity 
to window dressing, such that the compliance report 
is sufficiently informative to keep the manager from 
exerting manipulative effort. 
Appendix: Proof of Propositions 
Lemma I: 
Depending on the choice of manipulative effort, the 
agent's expected utility is given by (see also Demski, 
Frimor, and Sappington 2006) 
(Ala) e * o: -exp[ -r CEe(z;,a,e)] = 
-(1-q>) exp[ -r (j + v(maa +me e)- K(a,e) 
- lf2 r V2 o'2)]- q> exp[ -r (j + v(maa +me e)- p 
- K(a,e)- 112 r v2o'2)], 
(Alb) e = o: -exp[ -r CEa(z;,a)] = 
-(1-8) exp[ -r (j + v ma a- K(a,o)- 112 r v2d2)] 
- 8 exp[ -r (j + v ma a - p - K(a,o) - 112 r v2d2)]. 
Factoring out common parameters from the right-
hand side of (Ala), and performing some basic 
mathematical transformations yields 
(A2) -exp[ -r (j + v(ma a + me e)- K(a,e) 
- 112 r v2 o'2)]{(1-q>) + q> exp[r p]} 
= -exp[ -r (j + v(ma a + me e) - K(a,e) - 112 r V2o'2)] 
exp[ln[(l-q>) + q> exp[r p]]] 
= - exp[ - r (j + v(ma a + me e) - K(a,e)- lf2 r v2a2 )] 
exp[ - r(- r-1 ln[l- q>(l - q> exp[r p])])] 
= -exp[ -r (j + v(ma a+ me e)- K(a,e)- lf2 r v2a2 
- r-1 ln[l-q>(l - q> exp[r p ])])]. 
Replacing the right-hand side of (Ala) with (A2), 
and solving for CEe(z;,a,e) yields (7a). A similar 
approach results in (7b). 
Lemma2: 
(a) Substituting (8) into (7a) and (7b), and 
simplifying, gives the certainty equivalent as 
(A3a) CE/(z;) = f + 112 (ma2 + y me2 - r a2 )V2 
- r-1 ln[l- q> (1- exp[rp])], 
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(A3b) CEa*(z;) = f + 1f2 (ma2 - r a2)v2 
- r-1 ln[1- e (1- exp[r p])]. 
Substituting (A3a) and (A3b) into CE/ (z;) :-::; 
CEa*(z;), solving for v, and simplifying, completes 
the proof. 
(b) From (9a), limp~"' vc(p) = 2 (r y me2 )-1 ln[cp/8], 
i.e., a finite threshold result for an infinitely large 
penalty. Thus, the agent exerts manipulative effort 
if v > (2 (r y me2)-1Jn[cpj8])'12• 
Proposition 1: 
Setting CE/(z;) according to (A3a) equal to zero, 
solving for .f/, and substituting it into (10) yields 
(A4) IIe*(v,p) = b v ma- 112(ma2 + y me2 + r a 2 )V2 
- r-1ln[1- cp(1- exp[r p])] + cp p. 
From (A4), the derivatives with respect to v and p 
are 
(Asa) b m a- (ma2 + y me2 + r az) v, and 
(Asb) - cp exp[r p] (1 - cp(1 - exp[r p m-l + cp. 
Using (Asa) and (Asb) in the first order conditions 
gives (na). Substituting (na) into (A4) yields (nb). 
Finally, (na) confirms the assumption of a weak 
penalty that does not prevent window dressing. 
Proposition 2: 
Solving CEo*(z) = o forfo* yields 
fo * = -lf2 (ma2 - r a2 )V2 + r' ln[1 - 8(1 - exp[r p ])]. 
Substitutingfo*, p = p c(v), and ao* = mav into (12), 
and simplifying, yields 
(As) IIo*(v) = b ma v - 112 (ma2 + r a2 )V2 - r-1 In[1 
[
(1- B)exp [~rym~ v2 ]- (1- rp)l 
- 8(1 - exp[ In ])] 
rp-Bexp [~r r m~ v2 ] 
e l ( (I - B)exp[Jirrm:v2 ] - (1 - rp)J + r-1 n __ ____::___,__.,_ _ ____:_ __ _ 
rp - Bexp[Ji r r m:v2 ] • 
= b ma v -lf2 (ma2 + r az)v2 - r-1{ln[cp-8] - e 
ln[(1-8) exp[lf2ryme2 V2]- (1-cp)]- (1-8) ln[cp-8 
exp[lf2ryme2V2]]}. 
Differentiating (As) with respect to v gives 
(A6) ollo*(v )/ov = b ma- (ma2 + r OZ)v + 8 (1-8) 
y me2V exp[lhryme2 V2]x{((1-8) exp[lf2ryme2 V2 ] 
- (1-cp ))-1- (cp-8 exp[lf2ryme2 V2])-1}. 
162 
Finally, Vo* is the solution to ollo*(v)jov = 0. 
Corollary 1: 
The optimal incentive rate Vo * is less than or equal to 
v* = (ma + r az)-1 b ma if 
(A7) 8 (1-8) y me2V exp(lf2ryme2V2] 
x{(cp-8 exp[1f2ryme2 V2 ])-1- ((1-8) exp[lf2ryme2 V2 ] 
- (1-cp))-1} :-::; o, 
where the left-hand side of (A7) is the third addend 
in (A6). (A7) is true if 
(AS) (cp-8 exp[1f2ryme2vz])-1 
- ((1-8) exp[1f2ryme2V2]- (1-cp))-1 :-::; o. 
Simplifying (AS), noting that (1-8) exp[1f2ryme2V2 ] 
- (1-cp) > 0 for cp * 1 and e * 1, and 
cp-8 exp[lhryme2V2] > o for relatively weak effort 
incentives, i.e., v < (2 (r y me2 ) - 1 ln[cp/8])'12, results in 
exp[1f2ryme2V2 ] ;::: 1. Finally, substituting 8 = 0 into 
(13), and solving for vo* proves the statement. 
Corollary 2: 
Inspecting (A6) indicates that the right-hand side 
increases in b. 
Corollary 3: 
Observe that ve* is the solution to the following first 
order condition: 
Now, consider a larger incentive rate in the setting 
where the indicator variable is used to prevent 
earnings management as compared to the setting 
where the indicator variable is not used, i.e., 
vo* ;::: ve*. Comparing (13) and (A9), a larger 
incentive rate follows for 
8 (1-8) y me2 exp[lf2ryme2 V2]{(cp-8 
exp[1f2ryme2V2 ])-1- ((1-8)exp[1f2ryme2V2]-
(1-cp))-1} :-::; yme2. 
Simplifying yields 
(AlO) - 8 (1-8) ((1-8) exp[1f2ryme2 V2 ] 
- (1-cp ))-'- exp[If2rymezvz]-1 
+ 8 (1-8) (cp-8 exp(1f2ryme2V2])-1 :-::; 0. 
Observe that the first addend and the second 
addend on the left-hand side are negative since 
exp[1f2r y me2 V2 ] ;::: 1 and cp ;::: e. On the other hand, 
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the third addend is positive if cp-8 exp[If2ryme2 V2] ~ 
o, i.e., if 112 r y me2 V2 :-:; ln[cp/8]. In this case, this 
addend increases in v. Whereas the inequality in 
(A.10) is true for exp[l/2 r y me2 V2 ] = 1, the third 
addend goes to plus infinity for 
limexp[ h:rrmlv2 ]--7q;> 1 e · 
Hence, no general statement is possible regarding 
the sign of the left-hand side of(A.lO). 
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